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Abstract—Optimal transport has been used extensively in
resource matching to promote the efficiency of resources usages
by matching sources to targets. However, it requires a significant
amount of computations and storage spaces for large-scale
problems. In this paper, we take a consensus-based approach
to decentralize discrete optimal transport problems and develop
fully distributed algorithms with alternating direction method
of multipliers. We show that our algorithms guarantee certain
levels of efficiency and privacy besides the distributed nature.
We further derive primal and dual algorithms by exploring
the primal and dual problems of discrete optimal transport
with linear utility functions and prove the equivalence between
them. We verify the convergence, online adaptability, and the
equivalence between the primal algorithm and the dual algorithm
with numerical experiments. Our algorithms reflect the bargain-
ing between sources and targets on the amounts and prices of
transferred resources and reveal an averaging principle which
can be used to regulate resource markets and improve resource
efficiency.
Index Terms—Optimal Transport, Consensus-Based Decentral-
ization, Resource Allocation, Distributed Resource Matching,
Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers, Resource Markets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Resource matching plays an important role in many appli-
cations, such as emergency response [1]–[3], smart grids [4],
[5], wireless networks [6]–[8], and data centers [9], [10]. The
objective of matching is to assign resources with targets in
a way that promotes resource efficiency and increases social
benefits. For example, proper assignments of workers with
heterogeneous skills to jobs with heterogeneous characteristics
can improve the total economic output [11]; efficient allocations
of incoming customers to different parking slots can reduce the
average time and costs of finding parking spaces and improve
the overall parking capacity in smart cities [12].
Optimal transport is one of the centralized planning ap-
proaches to resource matching [11], [13]. A central planner
finds the optimal scheme to transport or move resources from
their sources to the targets that maximizes the social welfares.
However, the computations required to solve such planning
problem grow exponentially with the increase in the numbers
of sources and targets in large-scale problems. Moreover, the
communication overhead required for the planner to collect
information and coordinate between sources and targets is also
significant with a large number of participants (See Fig. 1(a)).
In certain cases, targets and sources may not be willing to
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(a) Power Grids (b) Medical Resources
Fig. 1. Examples of decentralized resource matching. Fig. (a) shows a smart
grid system whose objective is to increase energy efficiency by matching
different customers to different power plants. The centralized matching is not
efficient with the increase of the sizes of customers and available power plants
as it is challenging to collect the information of them in a short period of time.
Fig. (b) illustrates matching patients with hospitals. Each patient has his or her
own preferences on hospitals, such as locations, affordability, and proficiency.
It is impossible to collect all the information of patients and hospitals and
then compute the optimal matching between them in a centralized way as
patients may not be willing to share their preferences with others.
share any information to the central planner (See Fig. 1(b)).
Therefore, it is computationally and structurally costly for
the central planner to make a global planning for large-scale
systems despite the recent efforts on developing methods to
speed up the computations.
Decentralized methods and algorithms offer practical solu-
tions to reduce the complexity of the computations and make
large-scale matching problems feasible [14]–[16]. In this paper,
we aim to decentralize discrete optimal transport problems
and derive a fully distributed algorithm which dispenses
with a central planner to develop the matching mechanism
between sources and targets. We consider a consensus-based
approach in which consensus constraints are used to capture
the agreements between the participants and the central planner
on the matching. This approach allows the derivations of a
fully distributed algorithm for discrete optimal transport with
alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) [17].
Our algorithm does not require central planners to compute
the matching between sources and targets or store their
information. Each participant computes its own problem and
communicates with only the participants on the other side,
which enables parallel computations and yields high efficiency
compared to centralized algorithms. The consensus between
participants and central planners is simplified into direct
consensus between sources and targets. Each pair of source and
target updates their matching until they reach an agreement.
When all sources and targets reach consensus, the resulting
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2matching achieves the optimal social utility and coincides with
the centralized solution.
Besides the property of distributed computation and the
improved computational efficiency, our algorithm offers addi-
tional useful features on distributed resource matching. Our
algorithm guarantees a certain level of privacy as there are
no central planners to collect information and each participant
only shares information with the participants on the other side.
Our algorithm can be easily implemented online and does not
require rerunning the algorithm when participants leave or enter
the matching platform. Instead, the algorithm can update the
matching and adapt to changes in the preferences, resources,
and targets.
We further explore the dual problem of discrete optimal
transport with linear utilities which naturally provides a way
to study pricing schemes of resource matching. We leverage
the consensus-based approach to capture the bargaining and
agreement process of the participants on the prices of the
resources. We use ADMM to derive a dual algorithm which
shares similar characteristics with the primal algorithm on fully
distributed nature, efficiency, privacy, and online adaptability.
We further prove the equivalence between the primal algorithm
and the dual algorithm, and show that each sub-problem in the
dual algorithm is the dual problem of each sub-problem in the
primal algorithm.
Our algorithms provide useful insights of resource matching
in market environments. The optimal matching is achieved
through the bargaining between sources and targets on the
amounts and prices of transferred resources in the primal
algorithm and the dual algorithm, respectively. Each participant
proposes its offers with the objective of maximizing its utility
while minimizing its differences from the participants on
the other side. When all pairs of sources and targets reach
consensus on their motions, the achieved matching maximizes
the overall surplus.
Furthermore, our algorithms reveal an averaging principle
that sources and targets follow during their bargaining process.
The core idea is that a source and a target should propose
their current offers to be close to the average of their previous
offers. The principle indicates a fair and unbiased negotiation
between sources and targets. The convergence of our algorithms
to the optimal matching shows that the sources and targets
can maximize their total surplus by following the averaging
principle. Thus, the principle can be used to regulate sources
and targets in resource markets and improve the resource
efficiency.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We propose a consensus-based approach to decentralize
discrete optimal transport problems and further derive
a fully distributed resource matching algorithm using
ADMM. Each participant computes its own matching
decisions and only communicates with participants on the
other side.
• We demonstrate that our algorithm guarantees certain
levels of efficiency and privacy and show that our
algorithm is fully adaptive when changes occur in the
preferences, resources, and targets.
• We derive a fully distributed dual algorithm that provides a
pricing scheme of resource matching in distributed markets
and reveal an averaging principle that a source and a target
always compromise to the average of either amounts or
prices of transferred resources between them.
• We use numerical experiments to demonstrate the conver-
gence and online capability of our algorithm, and we also
corroborate the equivalence of primal algorithm and dual
algorithm.
A. Related Works
Our work is related to the literature on resource allocation,
optimal transport, and distributed optimization. Resource
allocation deals with the assignment or distribution of available
resources in efficient ways [18], [19]. Recent applications
include natural resource management such as lands and forests
[20], [21], sensor networks [14], [22], smart grids [4], [23],
human resources [24], and emergency response [2], [3].
Resource matching is one class of resource allocation with
multiple sources and multiple targets, and it finds the optimal
matching between multiple sources and multiple targets to
transfer resources and maximize the total surplus of them [1]–
[10]. Various approaches have been developed to study resource
matching, which can be summarized into two distinct categories.
Planning-based approaches focus on the designation of optimal
resource matching to maximize social welfare [11], while
market-based approaches study interactions between sources
and targets in markets through the analysis of supply and
demand of resources [25].
It is common for most planning-based frameworks to have
a central planner identify resources, sources, and targets, and
then design the matching [11]. However, this approach requires
a significant amount of computation for large-scale problems. A
lot of techniques such as approximation [26], belief propagation
[27], barrier methods [28], and network simplex [29], [30],
have been developed to speed up the computations.
Although market-based approaches do not require central
planners to design the matching between sources and targets,
they have their own disadvantages [25]. On one hand, it is
difficult to study every source and target and further analyze
their complex interactions for large-scale problems; on the
other hand, it is impractical to derive the optimal resource
matching as any matching pair is affected by all the other
matching pairs through the interconnections between sources
and targets.
In this paper, we build on the discrete optimal transport
framework which is a centralized planning-based approach
to resource matching, and aim to derive a fully distributed
algorithm to find the optimal matching between sources and
targets. Optimal transport studies the optimal allocation of
resources and provides economic interpretations and analysis
of assignment problems and their properties [11], [12]. Besides
resource matching, it has also been applied to areas such as
machine learning [31], image processing [32], and reflector
design [33].
A few distributed methods have been introduced to de-
centralize resource matching. For example, Gao et al. have
3developed a distributed algorithm to match resources to events
in sensor networks by exploring the tree metric from the
underlying network metric [14]; Buyya has proposed distributed
computational economy as an effective metaphor for the
management of resources and application scheduling in grid
computing [34]; Hasan et al. have developed a distributed
approach using stable matching to allocate radio resources for
device-to-device communication [15].
We consider a consensus-based approach using alternating
direction method of multipliers (ADMM) to decentralize
discrete optimal transport problems [17], [35]. ADMM provides
a natural methodology to develop distributed algorithms for
decentralized applications [36]–[38]. For example, Zhang et al.
have developed a consensus-based distributed algorithm with
ADMM to study the interactions between attackers and machine
learning learners in networked environments [39]; Zennaro et
al. have proposed a consensus-based clock synchronization
algorithm with ADMM [40]; Shen et al. have addressed the
distributed robust multicell coordinated beamforming by taking
an ADMM-based approach [41].
ADMM has been applied to solve transportation problems.
For example, Papadakis, et al. have shown proximal splitting
schemes for solving discretized dynamical optimal transport
[42]; Benamou, et al. have presented augmented Lagrangian
methods to solve the time-dependent optimal transport problems
[43]; Geissler, et al. have proposed an MIP-based alternating
direction method to solve power-constrained gas transportation
problems [44]. They have all focused on centralized algorithms.
In this work, we aim to address decentralized resource matching
and leverage ADMM to achieve a fully distributed algorithm
that boasts key features for decentralized systems.
B. Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
formulates centralized discrete optimal transport problems.
Section III develops a distributed algorithm for resource
matching and further extends it into an online version. Section
IV explores the primal algorithm and the dual algorithm of
discrete optimal transport problems with linear utility functions
and proves the equivalence between them. Section V provides
numerical experiments and Section VI presents concluding
remarks. Appendix A summarizes useful results of ADMM.
Appendices B, C, D, and E provide the proofs for Proposition
1, Theorem 2, Proposition 5, and Proposition 6, respectively.
The following table provides a summary of notations in our
paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we present a discrete optimal transport
framework for resource matching between targets and sources.
Let X := {1, ...,N} and Y := {1, ...,M} denote the sets of
targets and sources, respectively. We further use Xy ⊆X and
Yx ⊆ Y to denote the subset of targets connected to source y
and the subset of sources connected to target x, respectively. The
subsets Xy and Yx capture the situation where each participant
has only limited choices to match with the participants on the
other side, which often exists in large-scale matching problems.
Summary of Notations
x, y Target x, Source y
X , Xy All Targets, Targets Connected to Source y
Y , Yx All Sources, Sources Connected to Target x
G Undirected Bipartite Graph Between X and Y
pixy Amount of Resources Transferred from y to x
Πx, Πy, ΠG Amounts of Resources for x, y, G
Π(t)x , Π
(t)
G Amounts of Resources Proposed by x, X
Π(s)y , Π
(s)
G Amounts of Resources Proposed by y, Y
ux, vy Surplus of x, Surplus of y
uX , vY Surpluses of X , Surpluses of Y
wxy Price of Resources Transferred from y to x
wx, wy, wG Prices of Resources for x, y, G
w(t)x , w
(t)
G Prices of Resources Proposed by x, X
w(s)y , w
(s)
G Prices of Resources Proposed by y, Y
We can represent the possible matching between tar-
gets and sources by an undirected bipartite graph G :=
{{x,y}|y ∈ Yx,x ∈X } =
{{x,y} ∣∣x ∈Xy,y ∈ Y }. “Undi-
rected” indicates that if a target x knows a source y, i.e.,
y ∈ Yx, then the source y must know the target x, i.e, x ∈Xy.
“Bipartite” indicates that the only connections in the graph are
between targets X and sources Y to transfer resources.
Let pixy ∈ R≥0 denote the amount of resources that source
y provides to target x, and ΠG := {pixy|{x,y} ∈ G } denote the
set of the amounts of resources from sources Y to targets X
through the graph G . We further use Πx := {pixy|y ∈Yx,x = x}
and Πy := {pixy|x ∈ Xy,y = y} to represent the sets of the
amounts of resources to target x and from source y, respectively.
It is easy to achieve that Πx ⊆ΠG and Πy ⊆ΠG .
The objective of discrete optimal transport is to find the
optimal matching Π∗G that maximizes the total surplus of targets
and sources, which can be achieved by solving the following
optimization problem:
max
ΠG
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Yx
fxy(pixy)+ ∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈Xy
gxy(pixy)
s.t. px,l ≤ ∑
y∈Yx
pixy ≤ px,h, ∀x ∈X ;
qy,l ≤ ∑
x∈Xy
pixy ≤ qy,h, ∀y ∈ Y ;
pixy ≥ 0, ∀{x,y} ∈ G .
(1)
The objective function captures the total surplus given the
matching rules ΠG . Functions fxy :R≥0→R and gxy :R≥0→R
represent the utility functions for x and y, respectively. The
constraints capture each participant’s boundaries on the amount
of transferred resources. px,l and px,h represent the lower and
upper bounds for x, respectively, and they satisfy 0≤ px,l ≤
px,h; qy,l and qy,h represent the lower and upper bounds for y,
respectively, and they satisfy 0≤ qy,l ≤ qy,h.
However, there may exist no ΠG that satisfies the constraints,
and in that case, we cannot find the optimal matching by solving
problem (1). For example, when all sources Yx together cannot
provide sufficient resources to meet the minimum requirement
of target x, i.e., px,l > ∑y∈Yx qy,h, no Πx is feasible for x. In
this paper, we focus on situations with feasible ΠG .
Condition 1. (Necessity) The following inequalities must hold
to guarantee the feasibility of ΠG :
(a). px,l ≤ ∑
y∈Yx
qy,h, ∀x ∈X ;
4(b). ∑
x∈X
px,l ≤ ∑
y∈Y
qy,h.
Condition 1(a) indicates that any target can acquire the
minimum amount of resources. Condition 1(b) indicates that
the demands are lower than or equal to the supplies.
Condition 2. (Sufficiency) The feasibility of ΠG is guaranteed
if the following inequalities hold:
qy,h ≥ ∑
x∈Xy
px,l , ∀y ∈ Y ;
Condition 2 indicates that any supplier can provide sufficient
resources to satisfy the requirements of all the targets it knows.
Condition 2 is stronger than Condition 1. Note that problems
that do not meet Condition 2 but satisfy Condition 1 can be
still feasible.
We have the following assumption regarding the convexity
of the utility functions fxy and gxy.
Assumption 1. Both the utility functions fxy and gxy are
concave on pixy, ∀{x,y} ∈ G .
We use the following remarks to provide examples and
discuss the interpretations behind fxy and gxy.
Remark 1. The target x’s utility function fxy : R≥0→ R can
be expressed as follows:
fxy(pixy) =U
(t)
xy (pixy)−C(t)xy (pixy), (2)
where U (t)xy : R≥0→ R≥0 is a concave and increasing function
which indicates the revenues from consuming resources, and
C(t)xy : R≥0→ R≥0 is a convex and increasing function which
captures the costs of acquiring resources from y. The super-
script (t) indicates that the function belongs to the party of
targets, and it does not indicate exponentiation. We provide
several examples of U (t)xy and C
(t)
xy and their interpretations for
reference.
• U (t)xy := γxypixy is a linear revenue function with γxy denoting
the unit revenue gained from consuming resources;
• U (t)xy := γxy min(pixy, px) is a threshold revenue function. It
captures the situation when x has a threshold of consuming
resources and x cannot gain more revenues with more
resources after the threshold.
• U (t)xy := γxy log(pixy+1) is a concave log revenue function
which captures situations when the revenues increase
slower with more resources;
• C(t)xy := c
(t)
xy pixy indicates a linear cost function with c
(t)
xy
denoting the unit cost of acquiring resources from y.
• C(t)xy := c
(t)
xy pi2xy indicates a quadratic cost function which
captures situations when the costs increase faster with
more resources.
Remark 2. The source y’s utility function gxy : R≥0→ R can
be expressed as follows:
gxy =U
(s)
xy (pixy)−C(s)xy (pixy), (3)
where U (s)xy : R≥0→ R≥0 is a concave and increasing function
which indicates the incomes from providing resources to targets,
and C(s)xy : R≥0 → R≥0 is a convex and increasing function
which captures the losses caused by resource reduction. The
superscript (s) indicates that the function belongs to the party
of sources, and it does not indicate exponentiation. We provide
several examples of U (s)xy and C
(s)
xy and their interpretations for
reference.
• U (s)xy := δxypixy indicates a linear income function with δxy
denoting the unit income of providing resources to x;
• C(s)xy := c
(s)
xy pixy indicates a linear loss function and c
(s)
xy can
be interpreted as the unit loss of resource reduction.
• C(s)xy := c
(s)
xy pi2xy indicates a quadratic loss function which
captures situations when the losses increase faster with
more resources.
We have the following theorem regarding the existence of
solution to problem (1).
Theorem 1. There exists a solution (not necessarily unique)
for problem (1) if it satisfies Condition 1 and has a feasible
set.
Proof. From Section 4.2 in [45], since both fxy and gxy are
concave, there exists a solution for problem (1) . However,
since they may not be strictly concave, the solution may not
be unique.
Problem (1) captures the central planner’s objective of finding
the optimal matching to transfer the resources between sources
and targets. However, solving it requires a significant amount
of computations when the number of participants is large. We
aim to develop a fully distributed algorithm to find the optimal
matching which does not require a central planner. We take a
consensus-based approach and decentralize problem (1) with
alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM).
III. DISTRIBUTED DISCRETE OPTIMAL TRANSPORT USING
ADMM
In the centralized discrete optimal transport problem (1), the
central planner designs ΠG for sources and targets, we could
also interpret it as that sources and targets reach consensus
with the central planner on ΠG . Recall that pixy denotes the
the amount of transferred resources from y to x. Let pi(t)xy
and pi(s)xy represent the amounts of resources that target x
requests from y and source y offers to x, respectively, the
consensus between the participants and the central planner
can be captured with pi(t)xy = pixy and pixy = pi
(s)
xy . We further
define Π(t)G := {pi(t)xy |{x,y} ∈ G }, Π(s)G := {pi(s)xy |{x,y} ∈ G },
Π(t)x := {pi(t)xy |y ∈ Yx,x = x}, and Π(s)y := {pi(s)xy |x ∈Xy,y = y}.
The superscripts (t) and (s) indicate that the variables or
parameters belong to targets and sources, respectively, and
they do not indicate exponentiation.
As a result, we can rewrite problem (1) into the form of
ADMM as the following problem:
min
{Π(t)G ∈U1,Π
(s)
G ∈U2,ΠG }
− ∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Yx
fxy(pi
(t)
xy )− ∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈Xy
gxy(pi
(s)
xy )
s.t. pi
(t)
xy = pixy, ∀{x,y} ∈ G ,
pixy = pi
(s)
xy , ∀{x,y} ∈ G ,
(4)
5where
U1 :=
{
Π(t)G |pi(t)xy ≥ 0, px,l ≤ ∑
y∈Yx
pi(t)xy ≤ px,h,{x,y} ∈ G
}
,
U2 :=
{
Π(s)G |pi(s)xy ≥ 0,qy,l ≤ ∑
x∈Xy
pi(s)xy ≤ qy,h,{x,y} ∈ G
}
.
Problem (4) is a minimization problem with the objective
function from problem (1). Since both fxy and gxy are concave,
the objective function of problem (4) is convex. The constraints
in problem (1) have been included in the feasible sets U1 and
U2. The consensus constraints in problem (4) capture the
consensus between the participants and the central planner.
Furthermore, we can achieve pi(t)xy = pi
(s)
xy , which indicates the
direct consensus between sources and targets.
Let αxy1 and αxy2 denote the Lagrange multipliers corre-
sponding to the constraints pi(t)xy = pixy and pixy = pi
(s)
xy , respec-
tively, and then the augmented Lagrangian related to problem
(4) is
L (Π(t)G ,Π
(s)
G ,ΠG ,{αxy1}G ,{αxy2}G )
=− ∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Yx
fxy(pi
(t)
xy )− ∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈Xy
gxy(pi
(s)
xy )
+ ∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Yx
αxy1(pi
(t)
xy −pixy)+ ∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈Xy
αxy2(pixy−pi(s)xy )
+η2 ∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Yx
(pi(t)xy −pixy)2+ η2 ∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈Xy
(pixy−pi(s)xy )2.
(5)
Note that L is strictly convex with the quadratic terms
η
2 ∑x∈X ∑y∈Yx(pi
(t)
xy − pixy)2 and η2 ∑y∈Y ∑x∈Xy(pixy − pi
(s)
xy )
2,
and thus guarantees the convergence to a unique optimum
even when fxy and gxy are not strictly concave. The scalar η
controls the speed of the convergence.
We can achieve the following proposition after applying the
iterations of ADMM to problem (4).
Proposition 1. We can obtain the following iterations after
applying the iterations of ADMM to Problem (4):
Π(t)x (k+1) ∈ arg min
Π(t)x ∈Ux
− ∑
y∈Yx
fxy(pi
(t)
xy )
+ ∑
y∈Yx
αxy1(k)pi
(t)
xy +
η
2 ∑
y∈Yx
(pi(t)xy −pixy(k))2,
(6)
Π(s)y (k+1) ∈ arg min
Π(s)y ∈Uy
− ∑
x∈Xy
gxy(pi
(s)
xy )
− ∑
x∈Xy
αxy2(k)pi
(s)
xy +
η
2 ∑
x∈Xy
(pixy(k)−pi(s)xy )2,
(7)
pixy(k+1) = argminpixy
−αxy1(k)pixy+αxy2(k)pixy
+η2 (pi
(t)
xy (k+1)−pixy)2+ η2 (pixy−pi
(s)
xy (k+1))2,
(8)
αxy1(k+1) = αxy1(k)+η(pi
(t)
xy (k+1)−pixy(k+1)), (9)
αxy2(k+1) = αxy2(k)+η(pixy(k+1)−pi(s)xy (k+1)), (10)
where Ux := {Π(t)x |pi(t)xy ≥ 0,y ∈ Yx; px,l ≤ ∑y∈Yx pi(t)xy ≤ px,h},
Uy := {Π(s)y |pi(s)xy ≥ 0,x ∈Xy;qy,l ≤ ∑x∈Xy pi(s)xy ≤ qy,h}.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Algorithm 1
1: for k = 0,1,2, ... do
2: Each x ∈X computes Π(t)x (k+1) via (11)
3: Each y ∈ Y computes Π(s)y (k+1) via (12)
4: Each pair {x,y} ∈ G computes pixy(k+1) via (13)
5: Each pair {x,y} ∈ G computes αxy(k+1) via (14)
6: end for
Iterations (6)-(10) can be simplified further as shown in the
following Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Iterations (6)-(10) can be simplified further
into the following iterations:
Π(t)x (k+1) ∈ arg min
Π(t)x ∈Ux
− ∑
y∈Yx
fxy(pi
(t)
xy )
+ ∑
y∈Yx
αxy(k)pi
(t)
xy +
η
2 ∑
y∈Yx
(pi(t)xy −pixy(k))2,
(11)
Π(s)y (k+1) ∈ arg min
Π(s)y ∈Uy
− ∑
x∈Xy
gxy(pi
(s)
xy )
− ∑
x∈Xy
αxy(k)pi
(s)
xy +
η
2 ∑
x∈Xy
(pixy(k)−pi(s)xy )2,
(12)
pixy(k+1) = 12 (pi
(t)
xy (k+1)+pi
(s)
xy (k+1)), (13)
αxy(k+1) = αxy(k)+
η
2
(pi(t)xy (k+1)−pi(s)xy (k+1)), (14)
where Ux := {Π(t)x |pi(t)xy ≥ 0,y ∈ Yx; px,l ≤ ∑y∈Yx pi(t)xy ≤ px,h},
Uy := {Π(s)y |pi(s)xy ≥ 0,x ∈Xy;qy,l ≤ ∑x∈Xy pi(s)xy ≤ qy,h}.
Proof. Note that (8) can be solved directly as:
pixy(k+1) = 12η (αxy1(k)−αxy2(k))
+ 12 (pi
(t)
xy (k+1)+pi
(s)
xy (k+1)).
(15)
By plugging it into (9) and (10), we have that αxy1(k+1) =
1
2 (αxy1(k)+αxy2(k))+
η
2 (pi
(t)
xy (k+1)−pi(s)xy (k+1)) and αxy2(k+
1) = 12 (αxy1(k)+αxy2(k))+
η
2 (pi
(t)
xy (k+1)−pi(s)xy (k+1)). Thus,
αxy1(k) = αxy2(k) for k > 0, and we can achieve (13) from (15).
After writing αxy1(k) and αxy2(k) as αxy(k), we have (11), (12),
(14).
Algorithm 1 summarizes (11)-(14). Iterations (11) and (12)
are updates of target x and source y, respectively. Iterations
(13) and (14) are updates of pair xy. Iterations (11)-(14) are
fully distributed iterations to solve problem (4). A detailed
analysis of Proposition 2 and Algorithm 1 is provided in the
following subsections.
A. Convergence and Complexity
Since fxy and gxy are concave functions, we have that
− fxy(pi(t)xy )−gxy(pi(s)xy ) is a convex function, and thus iterations
(6)-(10) converge to the optimum of problem (4) from Lemma
1 in Appendix A. Since (11)-(14) come from the simplifications
of (6)-(10), we have that (11)-(14) converge to the optimum
6Fig. 2. Illustration of Algorithm 1. At every iteration, each target x or source
y achieves Π(t)x or Π
(s)
y with (11) or (12), respectively. Then, each pair of
target x and source y computes pixy and αxy with (13) and (14), respectively.
The iterations continue until convergence.
of problem (4). Thus, the convergence of Algorithm 1 to the
solution of problems (1) and (4) is guaranteed.
The algorithm computes Π(t)x , Π
(s)
y , pixy, and αxy at each
iteration. The complexities of computing Π(t)x and Π
(s)
y are
determined by the utility functions fxy and gxy and the quadratic
terms η2 ∑y∈Yx(pi
(t)
xy − pixy(k))2 and η2 ∑x∈Xy(pixy(k)− pi
(s)
xy )
2,
respectively. For example, if gxy is quadratic or linear, the
complexity of computing Π(s)y is equivalent to the complexity
of quadratic programming which is O(n3), where n is the size
of Π(s)y . pixy and αxy are obtained through matrix computations,
which have the complexity of O(1). The complexity of
Algorithm 1 is further affected by the number of participants
and connections between targets and sources.
B. Efficiency and Privacy
In Algorithm 1, each participant solves its own problem
with (11) or (12), and each pair of target and source updates
itself with (13) and (14). Thus, it is a fully distributed
algorithm which does not require central planners to collect the
information of participants and compute the optimal matching.
Algorithm 1 enables parallel computations and is more efficient
for large-scale problems. Moreover, the only information that
transmitted between participants are pi(t)xy , pi
(s)
xy , pixy, and αxy,
which reduces communication overhead and keeps privacy
at the same time. Each participant’s personal information
{px,l , px,h, fxy,Yx} or {qy,l ,qy,h,gxy,Xy} is also kept private
to itself. As a result, our algorithm guarantees certain levels
of efficiency and privacy compared to centralized algorithms.
C. Resource Market: Negotiations and Bargaining
In problem (4), the consensus constraints capture the con-
sensus between participants and central planners. Furthermore,
they can also be viewed as the direct consensus between sources
and targets through central planners. One interpretation of the
consensus constraints is that sources and targets must agree with
each other to form a matching in resource markets. Algorithm 1
further reflects the negotiations and bargaining between sources
and targets to reach agreements on the amount of transferred
resources.
pi(t)xy and pi
(s)
xy denote the amounts of resources that target
x requests from source y and source y offers to target x,
respectively. They are proposed by x and y to meet their
own objectives (11) and (12), respectively. pixy captures the
consensus between x and y that they must reach an agreement
on the amount of transferred resources, i.e., pi(t)xy = pixy = pi
(s)
xy
from problem (4). We can see from (13) that the agreement is
approached by continuous negotiations following an averaging
principle, i.e., pixy is taken as the average of pi
(t)
xy and pi
(s)
xy .
Moreover, we can see from (11) and (12) that x and y modify
their proposals pi(t)xy and pi
(s)
xy to not only maximize their own
utilities but also minimize the differences from their previous
negotiations pixy, respectively.
αxy is the Lagrange multipliers on the consensus constraints.
We can see from (14) that αxy captures cumulative differences
between x and y. A positive αxy indicates that x requests more
than y offers, thus, x will decrease pi(t)xy with term αxy(k)pi
(t)
xy
in (11), while y will increase pi(s)xy with term −αxy(k)pi(s)xy in
(12), and vice versa. αxy identifies the directions for x and y to
modify their proposals pi(t)xy and pi
(s)
xy . It reveals the tendencies
of sources and targets to reach agreements on the amounts of
transferred resources between them.
η controls each participant’s trade-off between its high utility
and a small total difference from others. We can see from the
last terms of the objective functions in (11) and (12) that a
larger η indicates that the participant cares more about reaching
agreements with the participants on the other side, while a
smaller η indicates that the participant pays more attentions
on maximizing its utility. Moreover, we can see from (14) that
a large η amplifies the degree of disagreement αxy, which will
increase the costs of disagreement for the participant through
the second terms of the objective functions in (11) and (12).
As a result, our algorithm reflects the negotiation and
bargaining processes between targets and sources in market
environments. Each participant aims to maximize its own utility
and minimize the differences from others. The matching is
reached by the bargaining between sources and targets on
the amounts of transferred resources following an averaging
principle. The averaging principle contains three aspects: 1)
each pair of source and target always settles at their average
amount of transferred resources after each negotiation; 2) the
source and the target then modify their proposals by reducing
their differences from the average amount of resources from
their last round of negotiation; 3) the negotiations repeat
until agreements are reached for all sources and targets. The
averaging principle provides a way to regulate resource markets
and improve resource efficiency as the convergence of our
algorithm to the optimal matching is guaranteed.
D. Online Distributed Resource Matching
In many applications, targets and sources may change over
time. For example, a source may increase its upper bound
qy,h when it has more resources to distribute; a target may
achieve more utilities with the same amount of resources
after improving the efficiency of resource consumption; new
participants may join the matching and old participants may quit
the matching. Our algorithm can be extended to its online form
to address the real-time requirements for these applications.
7Remark 3. Let X (k), Y (k), f (k)xy , g
(k)
xy , U
(k)
x , and U
(k)
y denote
the discrete optimal transport problem at time k, the iterations
of finding the optimal matching are:
Π(t)x (k+1) ∈ arg min
Π(t)x ∈U (k+1)x
− ∑
y∈Y (k+1)x
f (k+1)xy (pi
(t)
xy )
+ ∑
y∈Y (k+1)x
αxy(k)pi
(t)
xy +
η
2 ∑
y∈Y (k+1)x
(pi(t)xy −pixy(k))2,
(16)
Π(s)y (k+1) ∈ arg min
Π(s)y ∈U (k+1)y
− ∑
x∈X (k+1)y
g(k+1)xy (pi
(s)
xy )
− ∑
x∈X (k+1)y
αxy(k)pi
(s)
xy +
η
2 ∑
x∈X (k+1)y
(pixy(k)−pi(s)xy )2,
(17)
pixy(k+1) = 12 (pi
(t)
xy (k+1)+pi
(s)
xy (k+1)), (18)
αxy(k+1) = αxy(k)+
η
2
(pi(t)xy (k+1)−pi(s)xy (k+1)), (19)
where U (k+1)x := {Π(t)x |pi(t)xy ≥ 0,y ∈ Y (k+1)x ; p(k+1)x,l ≤
∑y∈Y (k+1)x pi
(t)
xy ≤ p(k+1)x,h }, U (k+1)y := {Π(s)y |pi(s)xy ≥ 0,x ∈
X
(k+1)
y ;q
(k+1)
y,l ≤ ∑x∈X (k+1)y pi
(s)
xy ≤ q(k+1)y,h }.
We can see from Remark 3 that each participant and
each pair of participants update based on the current discrete
optimal transport problem. We can continue finding the optimal
matching without rerunning the online algorithm when the
discrete optimal transport problem changes over time. Note that
the iterations in Remark 3 will always converge to the solution
of the updated discrete optimal transport problem. However, if
the problem changes quickly over time, the iterations may not
find any optimal matching. One way to address this issue is
to run a sufficient number of iterations to achieve the optimal
matching of the current problem, and then update the problem
and find the next optimal matching.
IV. DUALITY AND DISTRIBUTED DUAL DISCRETE
OPTIMAL TRANSPORT WITH LINEAR UTILITIES
In this section, we consider a special case of discrete
optimal transport problems with linear objective functions and
equality constraints, i.e., fxy(pixy) = γxypixy, gxy(pixy) = δxypixy,
px,l = px,h = px, and qy,l = qy,h = qy. Parameters γxy ∈ R≥0
and δxy ∈ R≥0 are the unit utilities for x and y, respectively.
Inequalities px,l ≤∑y∈Yx pixy ≤ px,h and qy,l ≤∑x∈Xy pixy ≤ qy,h
become equalities ∑y∈Yx pixy = px and ∑x∈Xy pixy = qy, respec-
tively. Moreover, we assume that all sources match with all
targets, i.e., Yx = Y and Xy =X .
The discrete optimal transport in this case aims to find the
optimal matching by solving the following problem:
max
{pixy|pixy≥0,{x,y}∈G }
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
pixyγxy+ ∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈X
pixyδxy
s.t. ∑
y∈Y
pixy = px, ∑
x∈X
pixy = qy, ∀x ∈X ,y ∈ Y .
(20)
Problem (20) is a well-studied problem in optimal transport
[11], [13]. We have the following condition regarding the
existence of its solution which captures a situation when supply
meets demand.
Condition 3. There exists a solution of problem (20), which
is not necessarily unique, if and only if the following equality
holds:
∑
x∈X
px = ∑
y∈Y
qy. (21)
We can easily verify that Condition 3 satisfies Condition
1. The optimal value, i.e., maximum total surplus, is unique,
which is also referred as the optimal transport distance:
D1 :=
sup
{pixy≥0}
{
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
pixy(γxy+δxy)
∣∣∣ ∑
y∈Y
pixy = px, ∑
x∈X
pixy = qy.
}
.
(22)
After introducing pi(t)xy and pi
(s)
xy with a similar approach in the
previous section, we can rewrite problem (20) as follows:
min
{ΠG (t)∈U1,Π(s)G ∈U2,ΠG }
− ∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
pi(t)xy γxy− ∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈X
pi(s)xy δxy
s.t. pi
(t)
xy = pixy, ∀{x,y} ∈ G ,
pixy = pi
(s)
xy , ∀{x,y} ∈ G ,
(23)
where U1 :=
{
Π(t)G |pi(t)xy ≥ 0,∑y∈Y pi(t)xy = px,{x,y} ∈ G
}
and
U2 :=
{
Π(s)G |pi(s)xy ≥ 0,∑x∈X pi(s)xy = qy,{x,y} ∈ G
}
. By Propo-
sition 2, we have:
Proposition 3. We can obtain the following iterations after
applying the iterations of ADMM to Problem (23):
Π(t)x (k+1) ∈ arg min
Π(t)x ∈Ux
− ∑
y∈Y
pi(t)xy γxy
+ ∑
y∈Y
αxy(k)pi
(t)
xy +
η
2 ∑
y∈Y
(pi(t)xy −pixy(k))2,
(24)
Π(s)y (k+1) ∈ arg min
Π(s)y ∈Uy
− ∑
x∈X
pi(s)xy δxy
− ∑
x∈X
αxy(k)pi
(s)
xy +
η
2 ∑
x∈X
(pixy(k)−pi(s)xy )2,
(25)
pixy(k+1) = 12 (pi
(t)
xy (k+1)+pi
(s)
xy (k+1)), (26)
αxy(k+1) = αxy(k)+
η
2
(pi(t)xy (k+1)−pi(s)xy (k+1)), (27)
where Ux := {Π(t)x |pi(t)xy ≥ 0,y ∈ Y ;∑y∈Y pi(t)xy = px}, Uy :=
{Π(s)y |pi(s)xy ≥ 0,x ∈X ;∑x∈X pi(s)xy = qy}.
Proof. We can find the iterations by letting fxy(pi
(t)
xy )→ pi(t)xy γxy,
gxy(pi
(s)
xy )→ pi(s)xy δxy, px,l ≤∑y∈Yx pi(t)xy ≤ px,h→∑y∈Y pi(t)xy = px,
and qy,l ≤ ∑x∈Xy pi(s)xy ≤ qy,h→ ∑x∈X pi(s)xy = qy.
One fundamental result of problems (20) and (23) is the
Monge-Kantorovich duality [11], which finds the dual problem
of discrete optimal transport and shows no duality gap between
the primal problem and the dual problem. The dual problem
enriches the economic interpretations and reveals the pricing
scheme of resource matching. In the following subsections, we
discuss in detail the dual problem of problem (23), and we
present a distributed dual algorithm which is found by solving
the dual problem with ADMM. We prove that the iterations of
the dual algorithm is equivalent to the iterations of the primal
algorithm in Proposition 3. Moreover, we show that αxy in
8Proposition 3 captures the price that target x pays to source y
as the compensation of transferring resources.
A. Dual Problem of Discrete Optimal Transport
We derive the dual problem of problem (23) which can
be used to develop the distributed dual algorithm of discrete
optimal transport and study the pricing scheme of resource
matching.
Theorem 2. Let ux ∈ R, vy ∈ R, w(t)xy ∈ R, and w(s)xy ∈ R
denote the Lagrange multipliers with respect to ∑y∈Y pi
(t)
xy = px,
∑x∈X pi
(s)
xy = qy, pi
(t)
xy = pixy, and pixy = pi
(s)
xy , respectively, the
dual problem of problem (23) is
min
{uX ,vY ,w(t)G ,w
(s)
G }
∑
x∈X
ux px+ ∑
y∈Y
vyqy
s.t.
γxy−ux−w(t)xy ≤ 0, ∀{x,y} ∈ G ;
δxy− vy+w(s)xy ≤ 0, ∀{x,y} ∈ G ,
w(t)xy = w
(s)
xy , ∀{x,y} ∈ G .
(28)
Proof. See Appendix C.
We summarize several interesting results of problems (23)
and (28) with the following proposition.
Proposition 4. The following facts hold for the primal problem
(23) and the dual problem (28):
(i) Problem (23) is the dual problem of problem (28).
(ii) (Monge-Kantorovich duality) The optimal value of problem
(23) is equal to the optimal value of problem (28). The
optimal transport distance (22) can also be written as
D2 :=
inf
{u,v,w(t),w(s)}
 ∑x∈X ux px+ ∑y∈Y vyqy
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
γxy−ux−w(t)xy ≤ 0,
δxy− vy+w(s)xy ≤ 0,
w(t)xy = w
(s)
xy .
 .
(29)
(iii) The solution {Π∗G ,Π(t)∗G ,Π(s)∗G } of problem (23) may not be
unique but pi∗xy = pi
(t)∗
xy = pi
(s)∗
xy always holds; the solution
{u∗x ,v∗y ,w(t)∗xy ,w(s)∗xy } of problem (28) is not unique but
w(t)∗xy = w
(s)∗
xy always holds. Let C ∈ R denote a constant,
{u∗x +C,v∗y−C,w(t)∗xy −C,w(s)∗xy −C} is also a solution of
problem (28).
(iv) if pi(t)∗xy > 0 or pi
(s)∗
xy > 0, we have u∗x = γxy−w(t)∗xy , v∗y =
δxy+w
(s)∗
xy , and u∗x + v∗y = γxy+δxy.
(v) u∗x ,v∗y , w
(t)∗
xy , and w
(s)∗
xy satisfy:
u∗x = max
y∈Y
{γxy−w(t)∗xy }, v∗y = max
x∈X
{δxy+w(s)∗xy }. (30)
Proof. We can verify (i) by deriving the dual problem of
problem (28). (ii) can be achieved by the minimax theorem
[46]. To prove (iii), we notice that γxy−(u∗x+C)−(w(t)∗xy −C) =
γxy−u∗x−w(t)∗xy , δxy− (v∗y−C)+(w(s)∗xy −C) = δxy− v∗y +w(s)∗xy ,
w(t)∗xy −C = w(s)∗xy −C, and ∑x∈X (u∗x +C)px + ∑y∈Y (v∗y −
C)qy = ∑x∈X u∗x px + ∑y∈Y v∗yqy + ∑x∈X Cpx − ∑y∈Y Cqy =
∑x∈X u∗x px +∑y∈Y v∗yqy as ∑x∈X px = ∑y∈Y qy in Condition
3. Thus, (iii) holds. We can obtain (iv) by complementary
slackness [47]. To prove (v), we first notice that the con-
straints in problem (28) imply that u∗x ≥maxy {γxy−w
(t)∗
xy } and
v∗y ≥maxx {δxy+w
(s)∗
xy }. However, if the inequalities hold strict,
u∗x and v∗y will not be optimal as one can achieve a lower value
of ∑x∈X u∗x px+∑y∈Y v∗yqy by selecting u∗x = maxy {γxy−w
(t)∗
xy }
and v∗y =maxx {δxy+w
(s)∗
xy }, and thus the inequalities are actually
equalities, which proves (v).
The dual problem and Monge-Kantorovic duality has largely
enriched the interpretation of optimal transport [11]. The
dual variables ux and vy can be interpreted as the individual
surpluses that x and y achieve in their matching with others,
respectively; the dual consensus variables w(t)xy and w
(s)
xy can be
interpreted as the proposed prices that x pays and y charges for
transferring resources, respectively. Proposition 4(iv) indicates
that a matching between x and y exists only if their individual
surpluses ux + vy are equal to their pair surpluses γxy + δxy,
which is also reflected in (28) on the minimization over the
overall individual surpluses under constraints ux ≥ γxy−w(t)xy ,
vy ≥ δxy +w(s)xy , and w(t)xy = w(s)xy , i.e., ux + vy ≥ γxy + δxy. The
prices w(t)xy and w
(s)
xy only serve as the compensation for
transferring resources and they do not change the total surplus
u∗x + v∗y = γxy + δxy of x and y. We can see from Proposition
4(v) that the objective of each participant is to maximize its
individual surplus by taking into account both its pair surpluses
and the prices it pays or charges.
The objective functions of problems (23) and (28) capture the
total surplus by summing over pair surpluses and individual
surpluses, respectively. On the one hand, we can see from
problem (23) that the primal problem of discrete optimal
transport aims to find the optimal matching rules that maximize
the total surplus of all pairs between X and Y ; on the other
hand, we can see from Proposition 4(v) that the dual problem
of discrete optimal transport aims to find an equilibrium where
all participants reach their highest individual surpluses. The
Monge-Kantorovich duality in Proposition 4(ii) indicates that
both interpretations return the same optimal values and reach
the maximum total surplus of all sources and targets.
B. Distributed Dual Algorithm
We have obtained a fully distributed primal algorithm to
solve problem (23) with ADMM as shown in Proposition 3,
and we can also obtain a fully distributed dual algorithm to
solve the dual problem (28) using similar methods. We first
introduce consensus variables wxy to decompose w
(t)
xy = w
(s)
xy as
w(t)xy =wxy and wxy =w
(s)
xy . Thus, problem (28) can be rewritten
as
min
{{uX ,w(t)G }∈U ′1 ,{vY ,w
(s)
G }∈U ′2 ,wG }
∑
x∈X
ux px+ ∑
y∈Y
vyqy
s.t. w(t)xy = wxy,wxy = w
(s)
xy , ∀{x,y} ∈ G ,
(31)
where U ′1 := {uX ,w(t)G |γxy − ux −w(t)xy ≤ 0,{x,y} ∈ G }, and
U ′2 := {vY ,w(s)G |δxy− vy+w(s)xy ≤ 0,{x,y} ∈ G }.
9Fig. 3. Illustration of the distributed dual algorithm. At every iteration,
each target x or source y achieves {ux,w(t)x } or {vy,w(s)y } with (32) or (33),
respectively. Then, each pair of target x and source y computes wxy and βxy
with (34) and (35), respectively. The iterations continue until convergence.
Proposition 5. We can obtain the following iterations after
applying the iterations of ADMM to Problem (31):{
ux(k+1),w
(t)
x (k+1)
}
∈ arg min
{ux,w(t)x }∈Ux
ux px
+ ∑
y∈Y
βxy(k)w
(t)
xy +
η̂
2 ∑
y∈Y
(
w(t)xy −wxy(k)
)2
,
(32)
{
vy(k+1),w
(s)
y (k+1)
}
∈ arg min
{vy,w(s)y }∈Uy
vyqy
− ∑
x∈X
βxy(k)w
(s)
xy +
η̂
2 ∑
x∈X
(
wxy(k)−w(s)xy
)2
,
(33)
wxy(k+1) = 12 (w
(t)
xy (k+1)+w
(s)
xy (k+1)), (34)
βxy(k+1) = βxy(k)+
η̂
2
(w(t)xy (k+1)−w(s)xy (k+1)), (35)
where Ux := {ux,w(t)x |γxy − ux − w(t)xy ≤ 0,y ∈ Y }, Uy :=
{vy,w(s)y |δxy− vy+w(s)xy ≤ 0,x ∈X }.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Iterations (32)-(35) can be used to solve problem (31),
and they are fully distributed operations. The complexity
of the dual algorithm in Proposition 5 is similar to the
complexity of the primal algorithm in Proposition 3. Iterations
(32) and (33) are individual operations which are quadratic
programming with O(n3) complexity; iterations (34) and (35)
are pair operations which are matrix calculations with O(1)
complexity. The complexity of the whole algorithm is further
affected by the number of participants and connections between
targets and sources. The dual algorithm also has similar
advantages of efficiency and privacy as the primal algorithm
since each participant solves its own problem and their personal
information {px,Yx} or {qy,Xy} is kept private to themselves.
However, the information communicated in the dual algorithm
is w(t)xy , w
(s)
xy , and wxy, rather than pi
(t)
xy , pi
(s)
xy , and pixy in the
primal algorithm, which indicates that the participants bargain
on the amounts and prices of resources in the primal algorithm
and the dual algorithm, respectively. We can also extend
the dual algorithm to an online version to address real-time
applications following similar methods used in the previous
section. The convergence of the dual algorithm is guaranteed
from Lemma 1 in Appendix A as the objective function
∑x∈X ux px+∑y∈Y vyqy is linear.
The distributed dual algorithm captures the bargaining
between sources and targets on the prices wG of transferred
resources. Target x offers a payment of w(t)xy and source y
requests a payment of w(s)xy to transfer resources from y to x. The
consensus constraints in problem (31) capture the agreement
between x and y on the prices as w(t)xy = wxy = w
(s)
xy . We can
see from (34) that the agreement is achieved by following an
averaging principle that wxy is the average between w
(t)
xy and
w(s)xy . Each x or y modifies its proposal w
(t)
xy or w
(s)
xy to maximize
its own surplus and minimize the differences from its previous
negotiations wxy at the same time. βxy captures the cumulative
differences between x and y on the payments, and it further
identifies the directions for x and y to modify their proposals.
η̂ controls each participant’s trade-off between a high surplus
of himself and a small difference from others.
The primal algorithm and the dual algorithm share a lot
similarities in terms of their structures and both of them
indicates an averaging principle on the bargaining between
sources and targets. We further prove the primal-dual relations
between their iterations. We shall see that αxy = wxy, pixy = βxy,
and η = 1/η̂ where αxy, pixy, and η come from the primal
algorithm and wxy, βxy, and η̂ come from the dual algorithm.
C. Relations Between The Primal Algorithm And The Dual
Algorithm
In this subsection, we prove the primal-dual relations
between the iterations of the primal algorithm in Proposition
3 and the iterations of the dual algorithm in Proposition 5.
Proposition 6. Let λ (t)xy ∈R and λ (s)xy ∈R denote the Lagrange
multipliers for (32) and (33), respectively. Iterations (32)-(35)
can be rewritten as
Λ(t)x (k+1) ∈ arg min
Λ(t)x ∈Ux
− ∑
y∈Y
λ (t)xy γxy
+ ∑
y∈Y
wxy(k)λ
(t)
xy +
1
2η̂ ∑
y∈Y
(λ (t)xy −βxy(k))2,
(36)
Λ(s)y (k+1) ∈ arg min
Λ(s)y ∈Uy
− ∑
x∈X
λ (s)xy δxy
− ∑
x∈X
wxy(k)λ
(s)
xy +
1
2η̂ ∑
x∈X
(βxy(k)−λ (s)xy )2,
(37)
βxy(k+1) = 12 (λ
(t)
xy (k+1)+λ
(s)
xy (k+1)), (38)
wxy(k+1) = wxy(k)+
1
2η̂
(λ (t)xy (k+1)−λ (s)xy (k+1)), (39)
where Ux := {Λ(t)x |λ (t)xy ≥ 0,y ∈ Y ;∑y∈Y λ (t)xy = px}, Uy :=
{Λ(s)y |λ (s)xy ≥ 0,x ∈X ;∑x∈X λ (s)xy = qy}.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Remark 4. The iterations in Proposition 3 and the iterations
in Proposition 6 are identical with η = 1/η̂ , pi(t)xy = λ
(t)
xy , pi
(s)
xy =
λ (t)xy , pixy = βxy, and αxy = wxy.
Thus, αxy in the primal algorithm captures the prices that
target x pays to source y as the compensation of transferring
resources, i.e., wxy in the dual problem (31). βxy in the dual
algorithm captures the amount of transferred resources from
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(a) k = 0 (b) k = 400
(c) k = 800 (d) k = 1200
Fig. 4. Online Discrete Optimal Transport Problems.
y to x, i.e., pixy in the primal problem (23). Both the primal
algorithm and the dual algorithm solve problems (23) and (31)
at the same time with updates on allocations pixy and prices
wxy, and the convergence to the optimum is guaranteed.
V. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we present numerical experiments of dis-
tributed discrete optimal transport. We first verify the conver-
gence of Algorithm 1 to the solution of problem (1), and we
also demonstrate the online adaptability of the online algorithm
presented in Remark 3. The experiment settings are described in
Fig. 4. Blue rectangles represent targets while green rectangles
represent sources. We let all px,h = 100 which indicates that
targets have high upper bounds on acquiring resources, and
all qy,l = 0 which indicates that sources can choose not to
allocate any resources. We consider both linear and quadratic
utility functions with γxy and δxy denoting the parameters, i.e,
f lxy(pi
(t)
xy ) =C
(t)
xy +γxypi
(t)
xy , glxy(pi
(t)
xy ) =C
(s)
xy +δxypi
(s)
xy , f
q
xy(pi
(t)
xy ) =
C(t)xy −γxy(pi(t)xy )2, and gqxy(pi(s)xy ) =C(s)xy −δxy(pi(s)xy )2. C(t)xy and C(s)xy
are constant to pi(t)xy and pi
(s)
xy . When k= 0, the resource matching
market has 3 targets and 2 sources. When k = 400, Target 1
and Target 3 increase their demands while Target 2 decreases
its demand; Source 1 increases its supplies while Source 2
decreases its supplies; Target 1 builds connection to Source 2;
some participants also have different utility parameters γxy or
δxy. When k = 800, Source 3 joins the market and provides
resources to Target 2 and Target 3. When k = 1200, Target 1
quits and the market now has two targets and three sources. All
four cases are feasible which can be easily verified. Algorithm
1 solves each case separately, while the online algorithm solves
all cases continuously. The results of them are shown in Fig. 5.
We can see from Fig. 5 that both Algorithm 1 and the online
algorithm converge to the centralized optimal solutions ΠcG
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Fig. 5. Evolution of Iterations (16)-(19) for the online resource matching
problem shown in Fig. 4. The centralized solution ΠcG and the corresponding
optimal value Dc are achieved by directly solving problem (1). The residuals
measure the differences between the current updates and the centralized
solution.
and the centralized optimal values Dc in all cases. Since we
do not need to restart the online algorithm when the problem
changes, the online algorithm is suitable for online resource
matching problems.
We then show that the primal algorithm in Proposition 3 and
the dual algorithm in Proposition 5 can be used to solve discrete
optimal transport problems (20) with linear utility functions,
and the convergence to the solutions is guaranteed. Let px
and qy be generated by i.i.d. uniform distributions on (0,1).
We then normalize {px} and {qy} to 1 so that ∑x∈X px =
1 = ∑y∈Y qy as required in Condition 3 which guarantees the
existence of a solution. γxy and δxy are also generated by i.i.d.
uniform distributions on (0,1). We consider three discrete
optimal transport problems ‘OT1’, ‘OT2’, and ‘OT3’ with
different numbers of sources and targets under this setting.
‘OT1’ has 20 targets and 20 sources; ‘OT2’ has 20 targets
and 100 sources; ‘OT3’ has 1000 targets and 2 sources. The
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Fig. 6. Evolution of the primal algorithm and the dual algorithm. The
centralized solution is achieved by directly solving problem (20). The residuals
measure the differences between the current updates and the centralized
solution.
results are shown in Figure 6. We can see that both the primal
algorithm and the dual algorithm converge to the centralized
solution ΠcG and the centralized optimal value D
c of problem
(20).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied a decentralized discrete
optimal transport problem using a consensus-based approach
and have derived distributed algorithms with ADMM to address
resource matching between multiple sources and multiple
targets. We have shown that our algorithms are fully distributed
and do not require central planners to compute the optimal
matching or store personal information of sources and targets,
which provides guaranteed levels of efficiency and privacy
at the same time. We have developed distributed primal and
dual algorithms by leveraging the primal and dual problems
of discrete optimal transport with linear utility functions
and further proved the equivalence between them. We have
demonstrated with numerical experiments the convergence of
our algorithms to centralized solutions, the online adaptability
of our algorithms for real-time applications, and the equivalence
between the primal algorithm and the dual algorithm for
cases with linear utility functions. We have shown that our
algorithms offer useful insights of resource matching in market
environments as the interactions between sources and targets
reflect the bargaining between them on the amount and price
of transferred resources. Furthermore, our algorithms have
revealed an averaging principle that sources and targets follow
during their bargaining process, which can be used to regulate
resource markets and improve resource efficiency. One future
direction is to deploy our algorithms to various applications
and explore other decentralization methods. Another future
direction is to investigate private resource matching through
differential privacy.
APPENDIX A: ALTERNATING DIRECTION METHOD OF
MULTIPLIERS
Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) is an
algorithm for solving problems in the following form [17]:
min
x∈Ux,y∈Uy
f (x)+g(y)
s.t. Ax = y.
(40)
where f :Rm→R∪{+∞} and g :Rn→R∪{+∞} are convex
functions, A ∈ Rn×m is a linear operator. The optimal value is
denoted by
p∗ = inf
x∈Ux,y∈Uy
{ f (x)+g(y) |Ax = y}.
With α ∈ Rn donating the Lagrange multiplier corresponding
to the constraint Ax = y, the augmented Lagrangian is
L (x,y,α) = f (x)+g(y)+αT (Ax−y)+ η
2
‖Ax−y‖22 , (41)
where the parameter η > 0 controls the impact of the constraint
violation in (40). The ADMM iterations are given by
x(k+1) ∈ arg min
x∈Ux
L (x,y(k),α(k)); (42)
y(k+1) ∈ arg min
y∈Uy
L (x(k+1),y,α(k)); (43)
α(k+1) = α(k)+η(Ax(k+1)−y(k+1)). (44)
Furthermore, we have the following lemma regarding the
convergence of ADMM from Section 3.2 in [17].
Lemma 1. Under the following assumptions:
(i) f : Rm→ R∪{+∞} and g : Rn→ R∪{+∞} are closed,
proper, and convex;
(ii) The unaugmented Lagrangian L0(x,y,α) = f (x)+g(y)+
αT (Ax−y) has a saddle point, i.e., there exist (x∗,y∗,α∗),
not necessarily unique, for which L0(x∗,y∗,α) ≤
L0(x∗,y∗,α∗)≤L0(x,y,α∗) holds for all x,y,α ,
iterations (42)-(44) converge as follows:
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• Residual convergence. r(k)= ||Ax(k)−y(k)||2→ 0 as k→
∞, i.e., the iterations approach feasibility.
• Objective convergence. f (x(k))+g(y(k)))→ p∗ as k→∞,
i.e., the objective function of the iterations approaches the
optimal value.
• Dual variable convergence. α(k)→ α∗ as k→ ∞, where
α∗ is a dual optimal point.
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
We first need to write problem (4) into
the form of (40). Let us define x =
[vec(Π(t)G )
T ,vec(ΠG )T ]T , y = [vec(ΠG )T ,vec(Π
(s)
G )
T ]T ,
and α = [vec({αxy1})T ,vec({αxy2})T ]T , where vec indicates
vectorization. Note that x, y, and α are all 2G× 1 column
vectors, where G is the number of connections between targets
and sources, i.e., the size of G . Thus, the consensus constraints
can be rewritten into its matrix form as Ax = y, where
A = [IG,G,0G,G;0G,G,IG,G]. Note that 0G,G and IG,G denote a
zero square matrix and an identity matrix of dimension G,
respectively. Moreover, we have x ∈ Ux and y ∈ Uy, where
Ux =
{
x|pi(t)xy ≥ 0, px,l ≤ ∑y∈Yx pi(t)xy ≤ px,h,{x,y} ∈ G
}
and
Uy =
{
y|pi(s)xy ≥ 0,qy,l ≤ ∑x∈Xy pi(s)xy ≤ qy,h,{x,y} ∈ G
}
. As a
result, we can use iterations (42)-(44) to solve problem (4).
Since there is no coupling among Π(t)x , Π
(s)
y , pixy, αxy1, and
αxy2, we can decompose (42)-(44) as (6)-(10).
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Note that problem (23) is a minimization prob-
lem with the objective function −∑x∈X ∑y∈Y pi(t)xy γxy −
∑y∈Y ∑x∈X pi
(s)
xy δxy. We consider problem (23) as maximizing
over ∑x∈X ∑y∈Y pi
(t)
xy γxy+∑y∈Y ∑x∈X pi
(s)
xy δxy in this proof. Let
ux, vy, w
(t)
xy , w
(s)
xy , ε
(t)
xy , and ε
(s)
xy denote the Lagrange multipliers
with respect to ∑y∈Y pi
(t)
xy = px, ∑x∈X pi
(s)
xy = qy, pi
(t)
xy = pixy,
pixy = pi
(s)
xy , pi
(t)
xy ≥ 0, and pi(s)xy ≥ 0, respectively, we can achieve
the dual problem of problem (23) as [47]
min
{uX ,vY ,w(t)G ,w
(s)
G ,ε
(t)
G ,ε
(s)
G }
∑
x∈X
ux px+ ∑
y∈Y
vyqy
s.t.
γxy−ux−w(t)xy + ε(t)xy = 0, ∀{x,y} ∈ G ;
δxy− vy+w(s)xy + ε(s)xy = 0, ∀{x,y} ∈ G ;
w(t)xy = w
(s)
xy , ∀{x,y} ∈ G ;
ε(t)xy ≥ 0,ε(s)xy ≥ 0, ∀{x,y} ∈ G ;
(45)
By introducing ε(t)xy ≥ 0 and ε(s)xy ≥ 0 into γxy−ux−w(t)xy +ε(t)xy =
0 and δxy− vy +w(s)xy + ε(s)xy = 0, respectively, we can achieve
problem (28).
APPENDIX D: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
We follow similar steps in the proofs of Proposition 1
and Proposition 2. Let x= [uX T ,vY T ,vec(w
(t)
G )
T ,vec(wG )T ]T
and y = [vec(wG )T ,vec(w
(s)
G )
T ]T . Thus, the consensus
constraints can be captured as Ax = y, where A =
[0NM,N+M,INM,NM,0NM,NM;0NM,N+M,0NM,NM,INM,NM]. Note
that N and M are the numbers of targets and sources,
respectively. As a result, we can achieve the following iterations
to solve (31).{
ux(k+1),w
(t)
x (k+1)
}
∈ arg min{
ux,w
(t)
x
}
∈Ux
ux px
+ ∑
y∈Y
βxy1(k)w
(t)
xy +
η̂
2 ∑
y∈Y
(w(t)xy −wxy(k))2,
(46)
{
vy(k+1),w
(s)
y (k+1)
}
∈ arg min{
vy,w
(s)
y
}
∈Uy
vyqy
− ∑
x∈X
βxy2(k)w
(s)
xy +
η̂
2 ∑
x∈X
(wxy(k)−w(s)xy )2,
(47)
wxy(k+1) ∈ argmin
wxy
−βxy1(k)wxy+βxy2(k)wxy
+ η̂2 (w
(t)
xy (k+1)−wxy)2+ η̂2 (wxy−w
(s)
xy (k+1))2,
(48)
βxy1(k+1) = βxy1(k)+ η̂(w
(t)
xy (k+1)−wxy(k+1)), (49)
βxy2(k+1) = βxy2(k)+ η̂(wxy(k+1)−w(s)xy (k+1)), (50)
where Ux := {ux,w(t)x |γxy − ux − w(t)xy ≤ 0,y ∈ Y }, Uy :=
{vy,w(s)y |δxy − vy + w(s)xy ≤ 0,x ∈ X }. Note that (48) can
be solved directly as wxy(k + 1) = 12η̂ (βxy1(k)− βxy2(k)) +
1
2 (w
(t)
xy (k+ 1)+w
(s)
xy (k+ 1)). As a result, iterations (49) and
(50) can be written as βxy1(k + 1) = 12 (βxy1(k) + βxy2(k)) +
η̂
2 (w
(t)
xy (k + 1)− w(s)xy (k + 1)), and βxy2(k + 1) = 12 (βxy1(k) +
βxy2(k))+ η̂2 (w
(t)
xy (k+1)−w(s)xy (k+1)), respectively. Thus, we
have that βxy1(k) = βxy2(k) holds for k > 0. As a result, after
writing βxy1(k) and βxy2(k) as βxy(k), we have (34) and (35).
APPENDIX E: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
We first derive the dual problem of (32). Note that the
Lagrange function of (32) is given by:
Lx(ux,w
(t)
x ,Λ
(t)
x ) = ux px+ ∑
y∈Y
βxy(k)w
(t)
xy
+ η̂2 ∑
y∈Y
(
w(t)xy −wxy(k)
)2
+ ∑
y∈Y
λ (t)xy
(
γxy−ux−w(t)xy
)
,
(51)
where λ (t)xy ≥ 0 are the Lagrange multipliers. By KKT
conditions from Section 5.5.3 in [45], we have ∂Lx∂ux =
px − ∑
y∈Y
λ (t)xy = 0; ∂Lx
∂w(t)xy
= βxy(k) + η̂w
(t)
xy − η̂wxy(k)− λ (t)xy =
0. Thus, we can achieve ∑
y∈Y
λ (t)xy = px, w
(t)
xy = wxy(k) +
1
η̂ (λ
(t)
xy −βxy(k)), and λ (t)xy ≥ 0. By plugging these equalities
into (51), we have ∑
y∈Y
λ (t)xy γxy− ∑
y∈Y
wxy(k)
(
λ (t)xy −βxy(k)
)
−
1
2η̂ ∑
y∈Y
(
λ (t)xy −βxy(k)
)2
. As a result, the dual problem of (32)
can be written as (36). Note that the terms wxy(k)βxy(k) have
been ignored as they are constant for λ (t)xy . After solving (36),
we can find w(t)xy (k+1) with
w(t)xy (k+1) = wxy(k)+
1
η̂
(λ (t)xy (k+1)−βxy(k)). (52)
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Following a similar method, we can prove that the dual
problem of (33) is (37). After solving (37), we can find w(s)xy (k+
1) with:
w(s)xy (k+1) = wxy(k)+
1
η̂
(βxy(k)−λ (s)xy (k+1)). (53)
By plugging (52) and (53) into (34) and (35), we can achieve
(39) and (38), respectively.
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